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CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Paul C. Giannelli
Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University

Of all the types of evidence with which a defense
counsel must deal, character evidence may be the
most difficult and dangerous- difficult" because of
the complexity of rules governing this area of Jaw and
"dangerous" because of the potential impact that
evidence of bad character may have on the jury. This
article examines the Ohio rules governing character
evidence.
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CIRCUMSTANTIAl USE
Evidence of a person's character is used circumstantially in most criminal cases. For example, a person's character for honesty would be circumstantially
relevant if that person were charged with theft. The
argument would be as follows: A person with an honest character tends to act in conformity with that
character and thus is less likely to steal than a person
with a bad character for honesty. Of course, the argument cuts both ways. A person with a bad character
for honesty tends to act in conformity with that
character and thus is more likely to steal than a person with an honest character. The circumstantial use
of character is sometimes known as propensity" or
~~disposition" evidence.
While character evidence has some probative value,
the courts have generally excluded this type of evidence because it comes with too much dangerous
baggage of prejudice, distraction from the issues, time
consumption, and hazard of surprise." C. McCormick,
Evidence 445 (2d ed. 1972). See State v. Lytle, 48
Ohio St.2d 391, 402, 358 N.E.2d 623, 630 (1976)
Although character is not irrelevant, the danger of
prejudice outweighs the probative value of such evidence."). As one commentator has noted, the exclusion of character evidence implements the philosophy that a defendant should not be convicted because he is an unsavory person, nor because of past
misdeeds, but only becau!ie of his guilt of the particular crime charged." 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller,
Federal Evidence 79 (1978).
The most important application of this principle in
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criminal trials is the rule prohibiting the prosecution
from introducing evidence of the defendant's bad
character in its case in chief. It has long been the rule
in Ohio that in lla criminal prosecution, until a defendant offers evidence of his general good character or
reputation, the state may not offer testimony of his
bad character or bad reputation ... " State v. Cochrane, 151 Ohio St. 128, 84 N.E.2d 742 (1949)(syllabus 3); accord, State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391,
402, 358 N.E.2d 623, 630 (1976); State v. Markowitz, 138 Ohio St. 106, 33 N.E.2d 1 (1941); Sabo v.
State, 119 Ohio St. 231, 163 N.E. 28 (1928); Hamilton v. State, 34 Ohio St. 82 (1877); Griffin v. State,
140hioSt. 55 (1862);Statev. Pigott, 1 OhioApp.2d
22, 197 N.E.2d 911 (1964). It is also error for the
prosecution to comment on the defendant's failure to
introduce evidence of good character. State v. Markowitz, 138 Ohio St. 106,33 N.E.2d 1 (1941).
The prohibition against the use of character evidence, however, is not absolute. There are three important exceptions:
(1) A defendant may introduce evidence of
his good character, and if he does, the prosecution may introduce rebuttal evidence of bad
character.
(2) A defendant may introduce evidence of
the victim's character under some circumstances.
(3) Either side may introduce evidence of a
witness' character for truth and veracity in order
to impeach that witness.
In addition, acts which may incidentally evidence bad
character may be offered for other purposes- for example, to show motive, identity, lack of knowledge
or accident. Before discussing these issues in detail, it
is important to consider how character may be
proved.
METHODS OF PROOF
A person's character could be proved by evidence
of reputation, opinion, or specific acts.
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Reputation
Reputation evidence is the most common method
of establishing character. Typically, a witness familiar
with the defendant's reputation concerning a particular character trait testifies about that reputation.
Reputation therefore is not synonymous with character; it is only one method of proving character.
"There is no doubt that counsel and even courts have
sometimes forgetfully treated character and reputation as synonymous . . . Character of a person is that
which he really is, rather than what he is reputed to
be ... " State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 53, 82
N.E. 969 (1907). The Ohio cases permit the use of
reputation evidence to prove character. E.g., State v.
Elliott, 25 Ohio St.2d 249, 267 N.E.2d 806 (1971 ),
· vacated on other grounds,· 408 U.S. 939 ( 1972); State
v, Cochrane, 151 Ohio St. 128,84 N.E.2d 742
(1949). See also Ohio Jury Instructions- Criminal
411.05 (Provisional 1974).
The offering party, however, must lay a proper
foundation establishing the witness' qualifications to
testify about a person's reputation in the community;
"The preliminary qualifications of the [character]
witness must be such as to advise the court and the
jury that he has the means of knowing such general
reputation of the [person] in the community ... "
Radke v. State, 107 Ohio St. 399, 140 N.E. 586
(1923) (syllabus 1). In addition, the "community"
may not be too "remote" - in a place "where he has
never lived, and where he is not shown to be generally
known or acquainted ... " Griffin v. State, 14 Ohio
St. 55 (1862) (syllabus 5).
Opinion Evidence
Character could be proved also by opinion evidence. For example, a witness who is sufficiently acquainted with the defendant could give his opinion of
the defendant's character. The courts, however, have
generally excluded opinion evidence. See C. McCormick, Evidence 443 ( 2d ed. 1972).
The Ohio cases are not clear on this issue. When
used for impeachment, character may only be proved
by reputation, not opinion, evidence. Cowan v. Kinney, 33 Ohio St. 422 (1878); Bucklin v. State, 20
Ohio 18 ( 1851 ). When used on the merits to show
the defendant's character, however, the same rule has
not been applied consistently. In an early case, Gandolfo v. State, 11 Ohio St. 114 (1860), the Ohio
Supreme Court authorized the use of opinion evidence:
A defendant who ... is entitled to give evidence of his
character for peace and quietness, is not limited to
proving what people may have said of him ... but is entitled to inquire as to his character from those acquainted with him, and they are authorized to speak from his
general peaceable and quiet conduct ... /d. at 114
(syllabus 3).

the quality of conduct involved in the issue. Such
familiar and intimate acquaintance may enable his
neighbors to read him as they would a familiar book.
/d. at 53-54, 82 N.E. at 971 (emphasis added).

See also Saba v. State, 119 Ohio St. 231, 239-40, 163
N.E. 28, 31 (1928); State v. Roberts, 71 Ohio Abs.
443, 448 (Ct. App. 1955); Gibbs v. State, 7 Ohio Abs.
374, 375 (Ct. App. 1929).
Although neither Gandolfo nor Dickerson have ever
been overruled, later cases apparently assumed only
reputation evidence is permitted. In fact, the Comment to the Ohio Jury Instruction on character
states; "Evidence of character must be confined to
general reputation." Ohio Jury Instructions- Criminal 411.05 (Provisional 1974). The case cited for
that proposition, however, specifically rejects proof
by specific acts but not opinion evidence. See State
v. Elliott, 25 Ohio St.2d 249, 253, 267 N.E.2d 806,
809 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 939
(1972).
Proposed Ohio Rule of Evidence 405(A), 51 Ohio
B. 186 (1978), would permit the use of opinion
evidence. This follows Federal Rule 405(a) and is
supported by the commentators. See C. McCormick,
Evidence 455-56 (2d ed. 1972); 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 1986 (Chadbourn rev. 1978).
Evidence of Specific Acts
A third way of proving character would be by introducing evidence of specific acts. For example,
evidence that a person stole money on a previous occasion would be relevant in ascertaining that person's
character for honesty. Although evidence of specific
acts may be the strongest evidence of character, the
courts have generally excluded this method of proof.
See State v. Cochrane, 151 Ohio St. 128, 134, 84
N.E.2d 742, 745 (1949); Hamilton v. State, 34 Ohio
St. 82, 86 (1877); Griffin v. State, 140hio St. 55,
63 (1862). The rationale for this prohibition was
commented upon in State v. Elliott, 25 Ohio St.2d
249,267 N.E.2d 806 (1971), vacated on other
grounds, 408 U.S. 939 (1972): "The admission of
such evidence would raise collateral issues and divert
the minds of the jurors from the matter at hand. It is
manifestly unfair to compel a party to defend specific
acts alleged as proof of bad reputation or character
... " /d. at 253, 267 N.E.2d at 809 (1971). There is,
however, an important exception in Ohio. R.C.
2945.56 permits the prosecution to rebut evidence of
good character by introducing evidence of a defendant's "previous conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude ... "
EXCEPTION FOR DEFENDANT'S CHARACTER
The first exception to the general prohibition
against the use of character evidence is that the defendant may introduce evidence of his own good
character. Typically, the defendant presents such
evidence by calling witnesses to testify as to his reputation in the community. In some cases the impact
of character evidence may be critical. As the U.S.
Supreme Court has commented: "The circumstances
may be such that an established reputation for good
character, if it is relevant to the issue, would alone

Gandolfo was subsequently followed in State. v.
Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34,82 N.E. 969 (1907), in
which the Court stated:
[W] e think the accused is not confined to his reputation
for a certain trait of character involved in the charge, but
may, by those most intimate with him during a course
of years, spread before the jury his real self, touching
2

case in chief, it may do in rebuttal.
Cross-Examination. The prosecution is permitted
to test the witness' qualifications to testify about the
defendant's character. For example, in State v.
Elliott, 25 Ohio St.2d 249, 267 N.E.2d 806 (1971),
vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 939 (1972), the
prosecution asked defense character witnesses whether they had heard about a felonious assault committed by the defendant on a ten-year-old girl. In upholding this type of cross-examination, the Court
stated:

create a reasonable doubt, although without it the
other evidence would be convincing." Edgington v.
U.S., 164 U.S. 361, 366 (1896). Accord, Michelson v.
U.S., 335 U.S. 469,476 (1948) ("[S] uch testimony
alone, in some circumstances, may be enough to raise
a reasonable doubt of guilt ... ").
Relevant Character Trait
The character trait proffered must be relevant to
the offense charged. For example, in Booker v. State,
33 Ohio App. 338, 169 N.E. 588 (1929), a defendant
charged with unlawful possession of intoxicating
liquor was precluded from introducing character evidence because it was not relevant. The court stated:

A character witness may be cross-examined as to the
existence of reports of particular acts, vices, or associations of the person concerning whom he has testified
which are inconsistent with the reputation attributed to
him by the witness - not to establish the truth of the
facts, but to test the credibility of the witness, and to
ascertain what weight or value is to be given his testimony. Such inconsistent testimony tends to show
either that the witness is unfamiliarwith the reputation
concerning which he has testified, or that his standards
of what constitutes good repute are unsound. /d. (syllabus 2)

In showing his character, however, [the defendant] is
confined to that trait of character that is inconsistent
with guilt of the offense charged in the indictment. The
accused in this case attempted to qualify a witness to
testify to the general reputation of the accused for truth
and veracity .... Such a reputation might properly be
shown in a case of perjury, but it is not a trait involved
in unlawful possession of liquor.
then attempted to
qualify a witness as to the 'general reputation ... for
being a peaceable, quiet, law-abiding citizen.' Objection
was made .... The court sustained this objection, observing that the crime charged was not one of violence,
and in this the court was right, for it is of course true
that bootlegging may be both peaceable and quiet /d.
at 341-42, 169 N.E. at 590.

He

The Court cited Michelson v. U.S., 335 U.S. 469
(1948), the leading case on this subject. Michelson
was charged with bribing an IRS agent. The U.S.
Supreme Court permitted the prosecutor to ask
whether the defense character witnesses had "heard"
about the defendant's 20-year-old conviction for a
trademark violation and 27-year-old arrest for receiving stolen property. Although such questions are not
supposed to be used as evidence of the defendant's
bad character, that in all probability is how the jury
will use the information, notwithstanding a limiting
instruction. This possibility alone cautions against
the use of character evidence unless defense counsel is
positive his client in fact has an unimpeachable character.
The prosecution's ability to cross-examine in this
manner is not without limitations. The possibility of
abuse has been recognized by both commentators and
courts. Wigmore wrote:

The Ohio Supreme Court has also recognized this
point.
The general character which is the proper subject of inquiry should also have reference to the nature of the
charge against the defendant. Thus, in the present case,
the defendant being charged with a crime necessarily importing dishonesty, called witnesses who gave evidence
tending to show a general good character for honesty.
Griffin v. State, 14 Ohio 55, 63 (1862).

See also Sabo v. State, 119 Ohio St. 231,239, 163
N.E. 28, 31 {1928) ("In a murder case, such reputation must relate to his being a peaceable, law-abiding
citizen"). Both Sabo and Booker authorize the use
of the general character trait bf being a "law-abiding"
citizen.

This method of inquiry or cross-examination is frequently resorted to by counsel for the very purpose of injuring
by indirection a character which they are forbidden
directly to attack in that way; they rely upon the mere
putting of the question (not caring that it is answered
negatively) to convey their covert insinuation. The
value of the inquiry for testing purposes is often so small
and the opportunities of its abuse by underhand ways
are so great that the practice may amount to little more
than a mere subterfuge, and should be strictly supervised by forbidding it to counsel who do not use it in
good faith. 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence 921 (Chadbourn
rev. 1970).

Number of Witnesses
Although R.C. 2945.57 places some conditions on
the number of character witnesses that may be called,
a trial court may not unreasonably limit the number
of character witnesses that a defendant may offer.
State v. Carter, 75 Ohio App. 545, 58 N.E.2d 794
( 1944) (error to exclude 3 character witnesses after 5
character witnesses had already testified).

~

Prosecutorial Response
By introducing evidence of his own character, the
defendant, in the words of Justice Jackson, may
"open(] a veritable Pandora's box ... " Michelson v.
U.S., 335 U.S. 469,480 (1948). This is because once
character is introduced, the prosecutor can respond in
two ways. First, the prosecutor may cross-examine
the character witnesses about prior incidents in the
defendant's past. Second, the prosecution may offer
evidence of the defendant's bad character in rebuttal.
Thu_s, what the prosecution is forbidden to do in its

The Michelson Court also commented that this type
of cross-examination placed a "heavy responsibility
on trial courts to protect the practice from any misuse." 335 U.S. at 480. The Court went on to point
out that the trial judge in that case
took pains to ascertain, out of presence of the jury, that
the target of the question was an actual event, which
would probably result in some comment among acquaintances if not injury to the defendant's reputation.
He satisfied himself that counsel was not merely taking
a random shot a( a reputation imprudently exposed or
3

activity, opinion evidence of the victi.m's sexual activity,
and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual activity
shall not be admitted under this section [rape] unless it
involves ... the victim's past sexual activity with the
offender .. .

asking a groundless question to waft an unwarranted in. nuendo into the jury box. /d. at 481.

Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court in Elliott remarked: "If the defendant had never been convicted
of a felonious assault, such question by the prosecutor, being made in bad faith, would be the predicate
for error .... " 267 N.E.2d at 809. Thus, once the
prosecution begins such an inquiry, defense counsel
should request a side-bar conference and demand that
the prosecution establish the basis for the question.
See also C. McCormick, Evidence 458 (2d ed. 1972).
There are additional limitations on the prosecutor's
cross~e:xamiiiatiori~ Only acts which would affect the
particular character trait offered by the defendant can
properly be raised on cross-examination. For-example, if the character witness testifies about the
defendant'scharacter for honesty, the witness cannot
be cross-examined about violent acts. This is why
evidence of general"law-abiding" character should be
avoided; it gives the prosecutor greater latitude on
crosscexamination as well as on rebuttal. See Michelson at 483-84. In addition, acts which are too remote
are not the proper subject of cross-examination. The
27-year-old arrest was admissible in Michelson only
because "two of [the character] witnesses dated their
acquaintance with the defendant as commencing
thirty years before the trial." /d. at 484.
Rebuttal. Once the defendant introduces evidence
of his ·character, the prosecution may call its own
character witnesses in rebuttal. The testimony of the
rebuttal character witnesses must relate to the character trait offered by the defense. With one exception,
rebuttal is restricted to the use of reputation evidence.
Stafev. CoC:h-rane, 151 Ohio St. 128, 84 N.E.2d 742
(1949). The exception is found in R.C. 2945.56
which provides: "When the defendant offers evidence
of his character or reputation, the prosecution may
offer, in rebuttal thereof, proof of his previous conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, in addition to other competent evidence."

Ohio's gross sexual imposition statute contains an
identical provision. See R.C. 2907.05(D).
The constitutionality of shield laws that preclude
the defendant from introducing arguably exculpatory
evidence has been questioned. Two U.S. Supreme
Court cases- Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974),
and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 ( 1973) are usually cited in support of the defendant's right
to introduce evidence of the victim's character in at
least some circumstances. In Davis the Court held
that a state statute excluding evidence of a juvenile
conviction (a type of shield law) violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under
the circumstances of that case. In Chambers the
Court held that the application of state evidentiary
rules which precluded the defendant from introducing
critical andreliable defense.evidence violated due
process. In addition, Congress recognized the force
of the constitutional argument in recently enacting a
federal shield law. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 explicitly recognizes that the admissibility of evidence
of the victim's past sexual activity may be "constitutionally required." Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1). Citations to articles discussing the constitutionality of
shield statutes are found in 22 C. Wright & K.
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 424-27
(1978). The Ohio statute is discussed in Comment,
Ohio's New Rape Law: Does It Protect Complainant
at the Expense of the Rights of the Accused?, 9 Akron L. Rev. 337 (1975); Note, Rape Reform Legislation: Is It the Solution?, 24 Clev. St. L. Rev. 463
(1975).
Homicide
A homicide defendant may introduce evidence of
the victim's violent character on the issue of selfdefense. The relevance of violent character in this
context is twofold. First, the defendant may wish to
show that the victim was the first aggressor- a person with a violent character will tend to act in conformity with that character and thus is more likely to
be the first aggressor than a person with a peaceable
character. If this is the reason the evidence is offered,
it does not matter whether the defendant was aware
of the victim's character at the time of the killing.
Once the defendant introduces evidence of the victim's character, the prosecution may offer rebuttal
evidence. See C. McCormick, Evidence 461-62 (2d
ed. 1972).
Second, the victim's violent character may also be
relevant to show that the defendant reasonably believed he was in danger of death or grevious bodily injury. This does not involve the circumstantial use of
character to show the conduct of the victim, but
rather the state of mind of the defendant. In this
case, however, the character of the victim must have
been communicated to the defendant before the fatal
encounter. Most of the Ohio cases involve this issue.
See McGawv. State, 123 Ohio St. 196, 174 N.E. 741

EXCEPTION FOR CHARACTER OF THE VICTIM
A second exception to the general prohibition
against the use of character evidence involves the victim's character. The victim's character has been admitted ( 1) on the issue of consent in rape cases and
(2) ·on the issue of self-defense in homicide cases.
Rape Cases
Under the common law, a rape defendant could introduce evidence of the victim's character for chastity. See McDermott v. State, 13 Ohio St. 332
(1862); McCombsv. State, 8 Ohio St. 643 (1858).
This rule rested on the assumption that a woman who
had consented to premarital or extramarital intercourse was more likely to consent in the future than a
woman who had not consented to such intercourse.
In recent years this assumption, along with other aspects of rape prosecutions, has been severely criticized. Approximately half the states, including Ohio,
have responded to this criticism by enacting "shield"
laws which limit the admissibility of evidence of the
victim's character. R.C. 2907.02(D) provides:
Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual
4
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(1931); State v. Roderick, 77 Ohio St. 301, 82 N:E.
1082 (1907); Upthegrove v~ State, 37 Ohio St. 662
(1882); Marts v~ State, 26 Ohio St. 162 (1875).
EXCEPTION FOR CHARACTER OF A WITNESS
In addition to other methods, such as bias or prior
inconsistent statements, a witness' character may be
used to impeach. Only the witness' character for
truth and veracity is relevant. This use of character
may be used by either the prosecution or the defense
and is permitted whenever a witness, including the accused, takes the stand. The Ohio cases permit the use
of reputation but not opinion evidence for this purpose. See Cowan v. Kinney, 33 Ohio St. 422 (1878);
Bucklin v. State, 20 Ohio 18 (1851 ). Specific acts if
evidenced by a conviction may also be used to impeach. See R.C. 2945.42; State v. Murdock, 172
Ohio St. 221, 174 N.E.2d 543 (1961). Whether specific acts not resulting in a conviction may be used for
impeachment is unclear. This topic is examined in
Giannelli, Credibility of Witnesses, 1 Public Defender
Reptr. (Dec. 197 8).
THE SIMILAR ACTS STATUTE
As discussed above, the circumstantial use of character is prohibited unless one of the three recognized
exceptions is applicable. If, however, an act which incidentally evidences character is offered for some purpose other than to prove character, the prohibition
does not apply. For example, if a person steals a gun
and later uses that gun to commit a murder, the theft
may be relevant in the homicide prosecution to show
~ the identity of the murderer. Thus, while the theft incidentally evidences character, it is not being offered
for that purpose. See State v. Watson, 28 Ohio St.2d
15,275 N.E.2d 153 (1971).
R.C. 2945.59, sometimes known as the "similar
acts" or "other acts" statute, identifies many of the
issues for which evidence of "other" acts may be admitted. It provides:
In any criminal case in which the defendant's motive
or intent, the absence of mistake or accident on his part,
or the defendant's scheme, plan, or system in doing an
act is material, any acts of the defendant which tend to
show his motive or intent, the absence of mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant's scheme, plan, or
system in doing the act in question may be proved,
whether they are contemporaneous with or prior or subsequent thereto, notwithstanding that such proof may
show or tend to show the commission of another crime
by the defendant.

In addition, the prosecution must offer ~~substantial
proof" that the defendant committed the prior act. ·
State v. Carter, 26 Ohio St.2d 79, 269 N:E.2d 115
(1971);Scottv. State, 107 Ohio St. 475,141 N..E. 19
(1923).
Defense counsel should require th!3t the. prosecution establish, out of the presence Of the jury, that
evidence of other acts is relevant to a contested issue
in the case being tried. In other words, such evidence
is not admissible solely because the prosecutioncan
identify one of the purposes mentioned in the statute;
the prosecution must show that the identified purpose is material in that particular case. As one commentator has remarked: "Particularly to be deplored
is what might be called the 'smorgasbord' approach to
analysis of other crimes evidence in which the court
simply serves up a long list of permissible uses without
any attempt to show how any of them are applicable
to the case at hand." 22 C. Wright & K. Graham,
Federal Practice & Procedure 479 (1978).
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit's decision fn Manning v.
Rose, 507 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1974), indicates that an
abuse of such a statute could run afoul of the due
process clause. Accord, Cunha v. Brewer, 511 F.2d
894, 900-01 (8th Cir. 1975); Heads v. Beto, 468 F.2d
240 (5th Cir. 1972); U.S. v. Johnson, 462 F.2d 592
(3d Cir. 1972); Atwell v. Arkansas, 426 F. 2d 912
{8th Cir. 1970).
For an excellent discussion of other acts evidence,
see 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice &
Procedure 427-551 (1978). The Ohio statute is discussed in Herbert & Mount, Ohio's "Similar Acts
Statute": Its Uses and Abuses, 9 Akron L. Rev. 301
(1975); Comment, Evidence of Criminal History in
Ohio Criminal Prosecutions, 15 Wes. Res. L. Rev. 772
( 1964); R. Markus, Trial Handbook for Ohio Lawyers
§§ 330, 341 (1973).
REFERENCES
C. McCormick, Evidence § § 186-94 (2d ed. 1972); 2
J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 404-1
to 405-41 (1977); 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal
Practice & Procedure, 325-640 (1978}; 2 D. Louisell
& C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 73-195 (1978); R.
Markus, Handbook for Ohio Lawyers§§ 336-41
(1973}; J. Hurd & B. Long, Ohio Trial Evidence ch.
11 (1957):

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Although evidence of "other acts" may be relevant to
show, for example, intent or motive, it is laden with
the potential of undue prejudice because the jury may
use the evidence for the impermissible purpose of determining character. This is true notvvithstanding a
limiting instruction. See Ohio Jury InstructionsCriminal 405.23 (Provisional 1974). Because of this
danger, evidence of "other acts" must meet stringent
standards to gain admissibility. It is admissible only if
it is "substantially relevant for some purpose other
than to show a probability that the individual committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character." State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391,
402, 358 N.E.2d 623, 630 (1976). (emphasis added).

Standing
At defendants' trial for armed robbery, the prosecution offered into evidence a sawed-off rifle and
shells which police had seized during a search ofa car
in which defendants were passengers. A motion to
suppress the rifle and shells, on grounds that the
search violated the Fourth Amendment was denied by
the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed because
the defendants lacked standing to raise Fourth
Amendment objections. Since they did not own the
car, the rifle, or the shells, the search did not violate
their personal rights.. Nor did they have any legitimate expectations of privacy in the searched areas of
5
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the automobile, since they were merely passengers.
In addition, the Court abandoned the "legitimately
.on premi?t;!s" test of jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960), asthe measure of Fourth Amendment
rights in favor of the Katz test of a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the invaded area. Rakas. v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1978).

gun, seized it, and arrested the defendant f9r carrying
a concealed weapon. At trial, the defendant moved
to suppress the weapon. The motion was overruled
and the defendant was convicted. The Ohio Supreme
Court found the search properly limited to the purpose of protecting the officer. It upheld the trial
court on the ground that "the search and seizure of
the weapon was reasonable in its inception and scope
[under Terry and Chime!], and therefore consistent
with the protections guaranteed by the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments." State v. Smith, 56 Ohio
St.2d 405 ( 1978).

Exclusion of Female Jurors
Petitioner contended that his right to trial by jury
had been violated because of a Missouri law which
granted women automatic exemption from jury service upon request. Based upon Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975), the U.S. Supreme Court held
"that such systematic exclusion of women which results in jury venires averaging less than 15% female
violates the Constitution's fair-cross-section requirement." The Court did go on to say, however, "[W] e
recognize that a State may have an important interest
in assuring that those members of the family responsible for the. care of children are available to do so. An
exemption appropriately tailored to this interest
would, we think, survive a fair-cross-section challenge." Duren v. Missouri, 99 S. Ct. 664 (U.S. Sup.
Ct. 1979).

(~
-~

Speedy Trial
R.C. 2945.71(B)(2) provides that a person charged
with a misdemeanor shall be brought to trial within
90 days of arrest. Reasonable continuances may be
granted pursuant to R.C. 2945.72. Because the defendant's tri~l promised to be lengthy, the trial court
sua sponte set a trial date 123 days beyond this mandatory time limitation. The Ohio Supreme Court
found this time extension to be "facially unreasonable," and looked to whether the record reflected
sufficient facts to support the continuance. The
Court held that use of a standardized entry form indicating a crowded docket is insufficient to support the
continuance. Also, the "fact that a comparatively
large number of witnesses was expected to be called
to testify at trial does not indicate such an exceptional circumstance as to justify the postponement ... "
Since the sua sponte continuance order was not "supported by sufficient detail" in the record, the defendant was discharged. Elmwood Place v. Denike, 56
1.
Ohio St.2d 427 (1978).
·~

Extradition
After the defendant was arrested in Michigan,
Arizona charged him with theft, and an arrest warrant
was issued in Arizona upon "reasonable cause" to believe he had committed the offense. The Governor of
Arizona then issued a requisition for the defendant's
extradition. The Governor of Michigan acted on the
requ-isition and ordered the defendant's extradition.
The defendant petitioned for a writ of habeus corpus,
claiming that the extradition warrant was invalid in
that it failed to comply with the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act. His petition was denied, but the
Michigan Supreme Court granted review and found
the extradition order insufficient because it failed to
show probable cause. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that under Art. IV,§ 2 of the Constitution, "the
courts of the asylum state are bound to accept the demanding state's judicial determination since the proceedings of the demanding state are clothed with the
traditional presumption of regularity ... When a
neutral judicial officer of the demanding state has determined that probable cause exists, the courts of the
asylum state are without power to review the determination . . . [W] e hold that once the governor of
the asylum state has acted on a requisition for extradition based on the demanding state's judicial determination that probable cause existed, no further judicial inquiry may be had on that issue in the asylum
state." Michigan v. Doran, 99 S. Ct. 530 (U.S. Sup.
Ct. 1979).
.·.

Speedy Trial
Under the Ohio speedy trial statutes an accused
must be brought to trial within 90 days if he is held in
jail during that period. R.C. 2945.71. In this case
trial was set for 91 days after the defendant's arrest.
Such a decision is not within the discretion of the
trial court. "When a trial date is set beyond the time
limits of R.C. 2945.71 and the accused does not
acquiesce in that date but merely fails to object to
that date, the trial court's action does not constitute
a continuance pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(H)." State v.
Cutcher, 56 Ohio St.2d 383 ( 1978).
Speedy Trial
On appeal, the State argued that the defendant had
waived his right to speedy trial when his counsel informed the trial court that the defense would be unable to proceed with the case until a later time. The
trial court made no order or entry granting a continuance. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the burden is upon the prosecution and trial court either to
see that the defendant is given a speedy trial, or to
grant a continuance with facts demonstrating its
reasonableness and necessity. State v. Siler, 57 Ohio
St.2d 1 ( 1979). -

Search and Seizure
Police officers stopped the defendant's car for a
traffic violation. As the officers approached the car,
the defendant-driver was observed pushing something
under the front seat. One officer ordered the defendant out of the car, and positioned himself outside the
vehicle so he could look under the seat. He saw a

Proof Necessary for Conviction Under Perjury Statute
Defendants were convicted of giving false testimony
to a grand jury under R.C. 2921.11. The State's
6

evidence merely showed that the defendants had allegedly made statements, not under oath, which were
in conflict with those made under oath. The Ohio
Supreme Court ruled that such a showing was insufficient to convict for perjury under R.C. 2921.11.
"We think it clear that proof of perjury can not be
made merely by showing a necessary conflict with
statements not made under oath." State v. Goodin,
56 Ohio St.2d 438 (1978).
Withdrawal of Counsel
When a defendant's appointed counsel files an application with an appellate court to withdraw under
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 ( 1967), the request
must "be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the
appeal." /d. The Court will then make a full examination of the record to determine whether the case is
wholly frivolous. If it is, the Court may grant counsel's request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. In
this case, the brief filed by the defendant's cbunsel
failed to comply with the Anders requirement.
Therefore, the request to withdraw was denied pending compliance with those obligations. State v. Duncan, 57 Ohio App.2d 93 (Cuyahoga Cty. 1978).

a

Defendant's Presence at In Camera Proceeding
At trial, the State sought to introduce testimony
under R.C. 2945.59 to show other acts tending to
demonstrate the appellant's identity or scheme, plan
or system in committing the act in question. The
defense moved to exclude and the trial court held an
in camera proceeding to determine admissibility.
Over objection the defendant was not allowed to attend. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant
had a right to be present during an in camera hearing
regarding "other acts" testimony. "We find it conceivable that in many situations a defendant's presence at such a hearing could result in his giving defense counsel information that could lead to the exclusion of such potentially damaging evidence from
consideration by the triers of fact .. ." State v.
Howard, 57 Ohio App.2d 1 (Hamilton Cty. 1978).

gregate minimum term of fifteen years, when the
consecutive terms imposed are for felonies other
than aggravated murder or murder ... " In interpreting this provision, the Court of Appeals considered
three points. First, this limitation is binding on all
consecutive terms, not just those imposed at any one
time or bx_ any one judge. Second, the legislature has
shown a p~sumption in favor of concurrent sentences
in R.C. 2929.41(A). Third, R.C. 2901.04 provides
that Code sections defining penalties "shall be strictly
construed against the state, and liberally construed in
favor of the accused." Thus, any ambiguity in the
provision concerning limitations on consecutive terms
must be resolved in the defendant's favor. The Court
concluded that when a consecutive sentence is imposed by a different judge after a separate trial, he is
limited by the aggregate number of 15 years. In this
case the trial judge erred in sentencing the defendant
to a term of 5 to 15 years consecutive to sentences of
7 to 25 years and 5 to 15 years imposed in an earlier
trial. The judgment must be modified to comply with
the 15 year aggregate minimum. State v. Wilson, 57
Ohio App.2d 11 (Hamilton Cty. 1978).
Preliminary Hearing for Indicted Defendants
The California Supreme Court has ruled that denial
of a preliminary hearing deprived indicted defendants
of equal protection under the California Constitution.
"[A] defendant charged by indictment is seriously
disadvantaged in contrast to a defendant charged by
information .... Indeed, current indictment procedures create what can only be characterized as a
prosecutor's Eden; he decides what evidence will be
heard, how it is to be presented, and then advises the
grand jury on its admissibility and legal significance.
In sharp contrast are information procedures in which
the defendant is entitled to an adversarial, judicial
hearing that yields numerous protections, including a
far more meaningful probable cause determination."
Hawkins v. Superior Court, 24 Crim. L. Rep. 2197
(Cal. Sup. Ct. 1978).
Warrant Needed for In-Home Arrest
The defendant was arrested inside his home for
murder by police acting without a warrant .. He then
made a statement admitting the murder which occurred three years earlier. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that "because of the Fourth Amendment
and the substantial expectation of privacy in one's
home, an arrest warrant is required to validly arrest
someone in his home unless exigent circumstances
exist to justify the warrantless intrusion." Given the
three year time span, there was no need for swift apprehension. There were no exigent circumstances.
Since the defendant's arrest was illegal, his confession
must be suppressed. Commonwealth v. Williams, 24
Crim. L. Rep. 2241 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1978).

Sentencing
The trial court ordered the defendant, a minor, to
pay a $500 fine and costs after she was found guilty
of consuming intoxicating liquor. On appeal, this sentence was found to be contrary to R.C. 2929.22 in
that the defendant, being indigent, could not pay the
fine "within the time [30 days] allowed without undue hardship .. ." The Court also found that the trial
judge acted improperly in basing the sentence on his
belief that the defendant had lied on the stand. "To
do so is in effect to punish [the defendant] for an offense for which he has been neither charged nor tried
and to discourage a defendant from exercising his
right to trial and to testify on his own behalf." State
v. jeffers, 57 Ohio App.2d 107 (Hamilton Cty. 1978).

"Farce and Mockery" Standard Rejected
The defendant petitioned for habeas corpus relief,
claiming that he did not have effective assistance of
counsel. His petition was dismissed by the District
Court on the ground that the cited acts and omissions
of the attorney were either not prejudicial, or did not

Consecutive Sentences
Limitations on consecutive terms of imprisonment
are set forth in R.C. 2929.41(E)(2), which provides
that such terms "shall not exceed: .... 2) An ag7

reduce the defendant's trial to a ·~farce and mockery
of justice." On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the·
"farce and mockery" standard, describing it as "outmoded." The Court held "that the Sixth Amendment
requires that persons accused of crime be afforded
reasonably competent and effective representation."
This test reflects both a higher standard and greater
objectivity than the prior one. Also, "the accused
must establish that counsel's errors prejudiced the
defense." Since no prejudice was evident, the denial
of relief was affirmed. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 24 Crim.
L. Rep. 2279 (9th Cir. 1978).
Conditional Guilty Pleas
to Preserve Fourth Amendment Issues
In U.S. v. Zudick, 523 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1975),
the Third Circuit approved the use of conditional
guilty pleas "in appropriate circumstances." The trial
court in the preseritcase relied on that precedent in
accepting the defendant's conditional guilty plea to
mail fraud. The defendant \ivas allowed to preserve
his right to appeal the trial court's refusal to suppress
evidence obtained in three searches and through electronic surveillance. In following Zudick, the Third
Circuit pointed out that in cases where there are no
questions of fact, there need not be a full trial simply
to preserve a legal objection. U.S. v. Moskow, 24
Crim. L. Rep. 2277 (3d Cir. 1978).

hood of misidentification. The court must look to
the totality of the circumstances, Including: "1) the
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the·
time of the crime; 2) the witness' degree of attention;
3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description; 4}
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the identification procedure; and 5) the length of
time between the crime and the identification procedure." Under the circumstances in this case- the
six and a half month time span between the rape and
the line-up, the brevity of the victim's contact with
the rapist, her inability to identify the defendant at
the time of the rape"despite her prior acquaintance
with him, the suspicions she and the other witnesses
had of the defendant, and the fact that she knew the
defendant was charged with the rape- the Court ·
found the line-up was improper. Carter v. State, 24
Crim. L. Rep. 2114 (Fla. Ct. App.2d Dist. 1978).
Stops- Lineups
The defendant was justifiably stopped by police
under Terry. However, his detention for 20 minutes
while the officers checked the area to see if any
crimes had been committed could not be justified "as
it was completely unrelated to the initial interference
by the officers . . . . The scope of the pol ice power to
detain must be related to the justification for the stop
at its inception- not to an after-found justification."
During the illegal detention, the officers discovered
that the defendant was wanted for armed robbery.
They arrested him and found evidence linking him to
the crime. He was then taken to the scene of the crime
a_nd identifie? by the vi_cti~_. The Court hel~·that
,,
smce the pol1ce had a s1gmftcant amount of mforma·.f:l
tion linking the defendant to the crime, he was more
than a potential suspect. Therefore, there was no
need for an at-the-scene identification. The defendant
should have been taken to the police station a~ provided a line-up and counsel. A new trial was granted,
and the suppression of evidence seized as a result of
the illegal detention and evidence of the at-the-scene
identification was ordered. People v. Dixon, 24 Crim.
L. Rep. 2225 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).

Attorney's Use of·a Fourth Amendment Claim
Reviewable on Habeas
In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the
Supreme Court ruled that when a person in state custody has had a fair hearing on his Fourth Amendment
claim and lost, he cannot obtain federal habeas corpus
relief based on that Fourth Amendment claim. The
Fourth Circuit interpreted Stone in a recent case and
said, "We do not read it to say that issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus on sixth amendment grounds is
barred if a defense attorney fails to object to the admission of evidence in clear violation of the fourth
amendment." Thus, the Court allowed federal habeas
relief where defendant alleged that he had been denied
effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Sallie v. North Carolina, 24 Crim. L. Rep. 2281
(4th Cir. 1978).

Fourth Amendment Rights of Probationers
Based on an anonymous phone tip that defendant
was dealing in drugs, his probation officer conducted
a search of his person and automobile. A small handgun was discovered which resulted in the revocation
of his probation and conviction for possession of a
dangerous weapon. The New York Court of Appeals
reversed, ruling that probationers have Fourth
Amendment rights. The Court did condition its rul-.
ing, however, by saying, "[o] f course the defendant's
status as a parolee or probationer is relevant in determining the reasonableness of the search." People v.
jackson, 24 Crim. L. Rep. 2318 (N.Y. Ct. App 1978).

Voice Identification line-Up
The victim and other witnesses identified the defendant as a rapist both at a voice identification lineup and in court~ The Appellate Court found that the
identification procedure was tainted and "substantially likely to cause mis-identification." The Court relied on Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), which
provided .five factors to be considered in determining
the admissibility of an out-of-court identification
where the procedure used created a substantial likeli-
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